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POLICIES FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY
dimitri b. papadimitriou, greg hannsgen, and gennaro zezza
We begin with the main points in this strategic analysis:
1)  The current account deficit will gradually fall during the medium term if the government
deficit is quickly brought to sustainable levels, but at the expense of growth and employment.
2)  If fiscal policy loosens, unemployment will decline and growth will resume, but the current
account deficit might soon begin growing again. This threat calls for stronger efforts to
devalue the U.S. dollar, mostly against Asian currencies, in order to spur U.S. exports and cut
American imports.
3)  The government deficit will not prove unsustainable over the medium term, provided that
interest rates remain low. It is within the power of the Federal Reserve (Fed) to keep rates low.
4)  Unemployment will remain stubbornly high unless there is a strong fiscal policy response.
5)  Since U.S. demand for petroleum products does not fall quickly when their prices rise, a
devaluation of the dollar alone would not have a sufficient impact on oil imports. Hence, a
more vigorous effort to promote energy conservation and the use of renewable energy sources
is needed.
When we published our strategic analysis in December 2008, the U.S. economy was still in severe
crisis (Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza 2008). Now, after unprecedented efforts by the Federal
Reserve, such financial indicators as the spread between interest rates on Treasury securities and
rates on riskier bonds reveal a more stable system. Congress has administered a large fiscal stim-
ulus of $787 billion. These policies, which have brought howls of protest from some orthodox
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Papadimitriou at 845-758-7700 or dbp@levy.org.economists lacking a pragmatic bent, made possible the attain-
ment of a 3.5 percent growth rate in the third quarter, accord-
ing to advance estimates. The far grimmer scenario of a
financial and economic freefall was conceivable when the reces-
sion began, especially for those who recognized the many par-
allels between the events of 2007–08 and the onset of the
Great Depression in 1929. In short, policymakers recognized
the threat of a depression, and adopted the “big government”
policies that are necessary in that situation. Our late colleague
Hyman P. Minsky wrote about the inevitability of such govern-
ment responses in times of severe financial turmoil, and argued
that they stabilized the economy, but always came at a price and
never brought true full employment (Minsky 2008 [1986]).
The nascent recovery is still very fragile, and one cannot be
very optimistic when the official measure of unemployment is
at 10.2 percent. Moreover, good policy-making strategy will
require a clear-eyed assessment of the prospects of the econ-
omy over the medium term. Discussions of these prospects
already abound in the public discourse. Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke has continued to emphasize the
importance of reducing imbalances even following his reluc-
tant acceptance of near-zero interest rates. “As the global econ-
omy recovers and trade volumes rebound,” he worries, “global
imbalances may reassert themselves” (Bernanke 2009).
Bernanke believes that the key to reducing imbalances is
to tighten fiscal policy as soon as possible without jeopardiz-
ing the recovery. How much stimulus has been applied so far?
A look at the rate at which the government and the Fed have
been generating financial liabilities (promises to pay) might
help us answer this question. Both of these important policy-
making institutions issue liabilities that affect the economy: in
the case of the Fed, these liabilities are mostly currency and
the reserve deposits of commercial banks; the federal govern-
ment, meanwhile, issues Treasury bills, notes, bonds, and
some other liabilities, which enable it to borrow money from
investors. Both kinds of liabilities allow the government to
spend in excess of its revenues, so they reflect the fiscal poli-
cies of the past. However, in many cases, the Fed “sells” liabil-
ities to the government, or vice versa. Two examples are the
Treasury securities held by the Fed for use in its open-market
operations, and the federal government’s “bank account” at
the Fed. Since these liabilities represent funds owed by one
part of the government to another, they do not increase the
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amount of money that the government owes to private
investors. Figure 1 shows three lines: one for the liabilities of
the federal government, one for the liabilities of the Fed, and
a third line for the sum of the two.1 (For the reasons stated,
the amounts shown in the figure do not include money that
the Fed and the federal government owe to each other.) The
liabilities have been divided by GDP to show their magnitude
relative to the size of the economy. The figure shows that total
public financial liabilities have risen over 53 percent relative to
GDP since the last quarter of 2007, when the recession offi-
cially began; just in the first half of this year, an increase of
roughly 7 percent has taken place. 
During the last two quarters for which data are available,
the Fed actually reduced its liabilities, but this reduction was
more than offset by rising federal government debt. On the
other hand, the figure provides the somewhat reassuring
information that, while public liabilities were much lower in
2007 than they are now, they were also at levels that some
Figure 1 Liabilities on the Consolidated Federal 
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Total Liabilities of Federal Government and Fed, Excluding Funds Owed 
to One Another, Divided by GDP
Federal Government Liabilities, Excluding Liabilities to Federal 
Reserve, Divided by GDP
Federal Reserve Liabilities, Excluding Liabilities to Federal 
Government, Divided by GDP
Note: Series shown in black equals total Fed liabilities minus checkable 
deposits due to federal government; series shown in orange includes total 
federal government liabilities minus Treasury securities held by the Fed minus
nonmarketable securities held by pension funds minus Treasury currency held
by the Fed. Assets and liabilities data not seasonally adjusted. found unnerving as recently as the mid-1990s. Moreover, at
61 percent of GDP, public liabilities have still not reached the
levels experienced in the aftermath of World War II (e.g., 73
percent in the fourth quarter of 1951).
As we pointed out in April, this comparison is apt
(Papadimitriou and Hannsgen 2009). In the years immediately
after the war, interest rates remained low despite the govern-
ment’s massive debt, because investors and banks were willing
to buy Treasury securities bearing very little interest. (Also, the
Fed cooperated with the Treasury Department to keep short-
and long-term interest rates low.) With the Great Depression
not far behind them, American businesses and households
were highly aware of the dangers of financial fragility. The
government had never defaulted on Treasury securities, while
memories were fresh of massive losses in more dubious invest-
ments. As households built stronger balance sheets, many felt
secure enough to afford a greatly improved standard of living.
Also, the financial sector enjoyed a long period of relative
calm in the two decades that followed the war, partly because
bank portfolios—heavy in Treasury securities, government
insured fixed-rate mortgages, and other safe investments—
held their value well (Minsky 2008 [1986], 13–99). This point
about the benefits of an abundant supply of securities with
minuscule default risks helps justify a continuation of stimula-
tive policy until the economy is on a firmer footing.
While we believe Bernanke has overemphasized govern-
ment deficits, our approach to macroeconomics gives a lead-
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ing role to all of the key financial balances—the private sector
deficit, the government deficit, and the current account
deficit—and we agree that it is important to keep them at sus-
tainable levels over the medium term. Given the current situ-
ation in the labor market (see below), U.S. fiscal policy does
not seem overly stimulative, and policymakers have expressed
what we regard as a timely openness to further new spending
and tax cuts. This strategic analysis focuses largely on the less
discussed but equally important current account balance. As
we will see below, the longest recession since the 1930s has
helped to reduce American demand for imported goods and
services, narrowing the current account deficit from 5.1 per-
cent of GDP in the second quarter of 2008 to 3.2 percent in
the third quarter of this year. However, as Bernanke points
out, efforts aimed at lowering or containing the trade deficit
may be needed once strong growth resumes. One approach we
consider below is a further devaluation of the dollar. Declines
in the dollar’s value against many major currencies helped to
boost exports between early 2003 and early 2008, and a new
devaluation began in the spring. However, China stopped allow-
ing the dollar to depreciate relative to the yuan in July 2008.
In this strategic analysis, we first take a long view. We
review how some important economic variables, including the
three main sector balances, have evolved over the past 30 years.
Then, making use of the Levy Institute macro model, we proj-
ect how some of these variables would change in the medium
term in three hypothetical scenarios: a baseline scenario pred-
icated on middle-of-the-road projections of fiscal policy and
future exchange rates; scenario 1, which assumes that fiscal
policy follows a more stimulative path; and scenario 2, which
assumes an 11.9 percent devaluation of the dollar from its
third quarter average and a fiscal policy stance that falls some-
where between the two posited in the other scenarios. Finally,
in our concluding section, we offer some policy suggestions,
based on our Keynesian perspective and the somewhat
encouraging results from the last scenario.
The Nascent Recovery in Historical Perspective
Perhaps the most dramatic sign of the recession’s severity is
the state of the labor market. Labor market indicators point to
conditions that the United States has not seen in a long time.
From 1980 until the early 2000s, the labor force participation











































































































Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)4 Strategic Analysis, December 2009
rate (all workers and unemployed people divided by the civil-
ian, noninstitutionalized population over age 16) was rising
with the entry of women into the labor force, despite a steady
fall in the participation rate of men (Figure 2a). By the begin-
ning of this decade, the growth of women’s participation rate
had stalled, allowing a sustained drop in the overall participa-
tion rate, to slightly above 66 percent, as large numbers of
men left the labor force. Since people who have dropped out
of the workforce are not counted as unemployed in official
figures, some portion of this group suffers from a form of hid-
den unemployment. (All figures in this strategic analysis show
quarterly data. For data that are available monthly or even
more frequently, we use quarterly averages.)
Also, the employment rate has tumbled since the beginning
of the decade, falling from just over 65 percent to about 59 per-
cent (Figure 2b). (This figure is the proportion of the civilian,
noninstitutionalized population that is working [BLS 2009b].)
The downward trend is the result of higher unemployment
rates and greater numbers of working-age people out of the
workforce as the decade ends. One question worth considering
is how much higher GDP would be in the United States today if
the employment rate were to return to its 2000 levels, bringing
6 percent of the civilian population back to work.
Figure 2c shows one of the most frequently discussed data
series produced by the U.S. government. The unemployment
rate, of course, peaked during or shortly after each of the last

























































































































































































































and the peak of the unemployment rate has lengthened over
time. The figure indicates one reason why many observers
grew very confident in the American economy’s performance
in the 1990s and 2000s: when this recession began, the most
widely reported version of the official unemployment rate
had not reached 8 percent since 1983. This figure was less
than 4.5 percent as recently as the second quarter of 2007, but
would reach over 9 percent two years later. It stood at 10.2
percent in October, and the more inclusive U6 unemploy-
ment measure, which includes discouraged workers and part-
time workers who want full-time work, equaled 17.5 percent
(not shown). Only workers well into middle age remember
such a poor national labor market.
The growth rate of real (inflation-adjusted) wages is
shown in Figure 2d. That rate is negative, despite the fact that
inflation has been kept in check by excess manufacturing
capacity, weak consumer demand, and low oil prices. Recently,
even rising productivity has not translated into real wage
growth, but profits have risen in the first two quarters of this
year. All of these labor-market statistics add up to a picture of
hardship for many Americans and to weak consumer demand,
which will make recovery more difficult. Reduced earnings
have especially grave implications right now, when many con-
sumers are burdened with excessive debt. 
Figure 3 shows four statistics that we follow very closely.
Real economic growth is measured at an annual rate on the
left axis. The other data series plotted in the figure are thethree financial balances: the private sector deficit, the com-
bined deficit for all three levels of government, and the current
account balance. Each balance is divided by GDP. By the
national accounting identity, these three numbers add up to
zero at any given point in time. Specifically, the identity is the
equation
(Private Sector Investment - Savings) + (Government
Spending - Taxes) + (Payments from Abroad -
Payments Made Abroad) = 0
Using the terminology in the figure, we can write the identity as
Private Sector Deficit + Government Deficit +
Current Account Balance = 0
Both sides of this equation can be divided by GDP to get
a relationship between the three balances that are depicted in
Figure 3. The national accounting identity has been the oper-
ational framework for our strategic analyses since 1999. (The
Appendixshows how this equation is derived. Wynne Godley’s
seminal analysis [1999] and the Levy Macro-Modeling Team’s
subsequent work, available at www.levy.org, show how it can
be applied.)
When either the public or the private sector runs a deficit,
its spending can help drive the economy forward. A deficit
indicates that the sector is either adding to its net liabilities or
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running down its net assets—in either case increasing its
financial fragility (Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva 2009).
Figure 3 shows that the private sector was playing this role for
much of the late 1990s and early 2000s. In contrast, this sec-
tor was in surplus (seen in the figure as a negative deficit)
from 1980 to mid-1997, as it was for most of the post–World
War II era. Now, private sector surpluses have suddenly
returned: 2.1 percent of GDP in the final quarter of 2008, 5.5
percent in the first quarter of this year, 7.7 percent in the
quarter that ended in June, and 8.6 percent in the third quar-
ter. The obvious reason is the sobering effect of a severe reces-
sion, seen in the figure as four quarters of negative growth
starting in the last quarter of 2008. (The National Bureau of
Economic Research has officially determined that the reces-
sion began in December 2007.) Leading up to the recession,
consumers and banks let their balance sheets become very
fragile amid euphoria over the stock market and housing bub-
bles, and the “Great Moderation” of the business cycle. This
pattern has recurred many times in U.S. economic history, as
Minsky pointed out throughout his career: as a period of
good economic fortunes progresses, bankers, consumers, and
others become overconfident and take excessive financial
risks, leading to what he called financial fragility (2008
[1986]). These periods of complacency have always ended














































































































































































Government Deficit, Divided by GDP (left scale)
Real GDP Growth Rate (right scale)
Current Account Balance, Divided by GDP (left scale)
Private Sector Deficit, Divided by GDP (left scale)












































o6 Strategic Analysis, December 2009
cut spending, try to pay off debt, and move funds to safer
investments. A recession has often followed.
Since the three financial balances add up to zero, the sud-
den reversal of the private sector deficit that began in the sec-
ond quarter of 2008 has been ineluctably accompanied by
changes in the other two balances. The government deficit has
soared—a fact that has drawn much attention—while the
troublingly large current account deficit has begun to decline
from levels we have long described as unsustainable. The gov-
ernment deficit usually rises in a recession simply because of
declining tax revenues, even if tax rates and government expen-
ditures remain roughly constant. Hence, the sharply inclined
government deficit line in the figure does not closely reflect
deliberate policy actions by Congress and the president. 
Leading economic indicators and advance GDP data
already strongly suggest that growth is positive, but at this
point there are no grounds for predicting a robust recovery. In
fact, in our baseline scenario below, we project a growth reces-
sion with little reduction in unemployment through the end
of the simulation period in 2015. (A “growth recession” is
defined here as a period of growth that is positive, but not
strong enough to restore the health of the labor market.) 
One factor that will influence the strength of the recovery
is the state of the housing market. Figure 4 shows the collapse
of the housing bubble using three common measures of the
cost of housing. The Case-Shiller 10-city Composite Home
Price Index, which uses data on repeated sales of the same
properties, was down 36.4 percent in the second quarter of
this year from the peak of the market in the second quarter of
2006. More recent monthly data show that house prices rose
in July and August. The National Association of Realtors
(NAR) existing single-family home index does not use
repeated sales. Hence, the NAR does not keep constant the
quality and size of the homes in its sample. The GDP deflator
for residential investment measures the costs of constructing
new housing and, of all the indexes in the figure, it is the least
informative about the health of the housing market. It is
interesting to note that all three indexes follow a hump-
shaped path over the course of the decade, telling the story of
a bubble that burst. With numerous homes on the market and
more foreclosed properties to come, it is far too early to say
that the recent upturn marks the end of the housing bust. The
expected renewal of the $8,000 tax credit for home buyers will
help sustain the residential property–value recovery. How
quickly the bear market in housing ends may determine
whether homeowners whose mortgage payments will rise
during the next few years will lose their homes. Even home-
owners who have paid off their mortgages tend to reduce their
consumption when the value of their assets declines. (For
some empirical evidence, see Case, Quigley, and Shiller 2005





























































Figure 4 Real Housing Price Indexes
NAR Existing Single-family Home Index
Case-Shiller 10-city Index
GDP Deflator for Residential Investment
Sources: S & P; National Association of Realtors (NAR); BEA; authors’ 












































































Figure 5 Real Investment Growth
Real Nonresidential Investment
Real Residential Investment



































































































9The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
sector still have much at stake as the housing market struggles
to recover.
Figure 5 shows the well-known collapse in residential
investment that began more than a year before the recession
began. Now, the recession has taken a further toll on new
investment of all types. Residential investment has fallen at
double-digit rates year-on-year in real terms since the third
quarter of 2006; nonresidential investment began falling in
the last quarter of 2008, and dropped nearly 19 percent in the
third quarter from a year before, probably dragged down by
the falling profit expectations that inevitably come with a
severe recession. 
The value of equities is one driver of investment and con-
sumer spending. Figure 6 illustrates two big drops in the S & P
500 stock index: the tech bust in 2000, and the recent financial
crisis and recession. The data for this year show that the index
has managed to climb back over 1000. Financial services com-
panies and companies in the automobile and truck manufac-
turing sector have been among the leaders in this trend. Some
hazards lie ahead for these industries and others now that the
cash-for-clunkers program has ended and many segments of
the financial sector deal with weak demand and/or nonper-
forming assets. The favorable third-quarter profit reports
released by many large banks mostly reflect trading gains
rather than a recovery of lending operations, which would be
crucial to a sustained recovery in banking and other sectors. 
Minsky reminded his readers often of the importance of
households’ and businesses’ balance sheets and their commit-
ments to pay back loans in cash. The next three figures pro-
vide some perspective on these key factors in the developing
recovery. Figure 7 shows that household debt as a percentage
of GDP escalated almost unremittingly for almost three
decades, reaching over 97 percent in the first quarter of this
year. This percentage vastly exceeds historical norms; as





























































Figure 6 S & P 500 Index
S & P 500 Index






































































Figure 7 Household Borrowing and Debt
Household Borrowing (right scale)
Household Debt (left scale)









































































































Figure 8 Nonfinancial-business Borrowing and Debt
Nonfinancial-business Borrowing (right scale)
Nonfinancial-business Debt (left scale)















































90the last four quarters, household borrowing has been nega-
tive, meaning the household sector has been paying off debt at
a faster rate than it has taken out new loans. Despite this
unsurprising change, household debt had fallen only slightly
as a percentage of GDP as of the second quarter, and will act
as a drag on consumer spending for some time to come.
Nonfinancial business has also increased its debt as a per-
centage of GDP over the long run (Figure 8), though this
increase was not as steady or steep. Like households, compa-
nies outside of the financial sector face a heavy debt load by
some measures, just as demand for their products has dropped.
They, too, have adapted to weak demand and tight credit mar-
ket conditions by paying back loans and not taking out new
ones. In the fall of 2007, the last quarter before the current
recession began, borrowing by nonfinancial business had
reached over 10 percent of GDP, while debt attained its peak
of 79.0 percent of GDP in the first quarter of 2009. In the sec-
ond quarter of 2009, nonfinancial business borrowing and debt
were equal to -1.4 percent and 78.9 percent of GDP, respectively.
Figure 9 presents some data on what these debt and bor-
rowing data mean for the cash flow of households and busi-
nesses. For each of these two sectors, the figure reports the
ratio of a rough estimate of interest payments to GDP. There
has been a downward trend in this debt-service burden for
nonfinancial business, which may seem puzzling in light of
the rise in this sector’s debt shown in the previous figure. The
explanation is a downward trend in interest rates that fol-
lowed Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker’s cam-
paign against inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a
movement that continued despite subsequent Fed chairmen’s
adherence to variants of the hawkish approach to monetary
policy initiated during Volcker’s tenure. 
Among other things, our approach to macroeconomics
emphasizes the implications of “flows” like saving and bor-
rowing for “stocks” of assets and debts, and, in particular, for
the sustainability of trends in spending by households and
businesses. In the 1990s, the U.S. debt binge was financed
largely from abroad by willing trading partners eager to main-
tain their export-led growth machines. In the third quarter of
1991, the United States began running a current account
deficit, which reached over 6 percent of GDP in 2006, as seen
in Figure 10. In keeping with the spirit of Godley and Francis
Cripps’s (1983) emphasis on stable “stock-flow norms,” we
have pointed out many times that what had gone up—in this
case, U.S. household borrowing—would eventually come down. 
Aside from the bubble in real estate values, one key rea-
son was the unsustainable increase in U.S. net foreign assets
(NFA, roughly the difference between our financial claims on
the rest of the world and the rest of the world’s claims on us)























































































































































Figure 10 U.S. Net Foreign Assets and Current Account 
Balance
Net Foreign Assets (NFA) at Market Value (right scale)
NFA at Historic Costs (right scale)
Current Account Balance (left scale)
















































20to GDP. The remaining data series shown in Figure 10 are
measures of NFA divided by GDP. The smoothly declining
curve depicts NFA/GDP when assets and debts are measured
at their original values. This curve essentially traces the cumu-
lative sum of U.S. current account deficits since 1960. Another
curve shows the same ratio, this time adjusted for changes in
the market values of financial assets and direct investment
owned in the United States and abroad, as published by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
There have been debates about the accuracy of these offi-
cial statistics, but current readings of both NFA gauges war-
rant deep concern. Notably, if the buildup of debt to foreigners
slows down further, U.S. businesses, households, and/or state
and federal governments will have to reduce their debt-financed
spending. On the other hand, if substantial current account
deficits persist, reducing NFA, the risk of a catastrophic drop
in the value of the dollar (that is, the exchange rate) would be
increased.
Figure 11 shows the current account balances of some
countries as percentages of U.S. GDP. Using the same denom-
inator for all five lines allows one to compare the size of the
U.S. balance with those of the other economies. Only yearly
current account data are available for some countries, so the
last data points in the figure are for the year 2008. As the
American deficit worsened in the 1990s, China and the oil-
exporting “bloc” of Russia and the OPEC countries ran
sharply increasing current account surpluses. 
China’s undervalued currency bears much of the respon-
sibility for that country’s surplus, as the prices of U.S. exports
and imports in their respective markets depend partly on the
exchange rates between the dollar and other currencies. The
nominal exchange rate shown in Figure 12 measures the value
of one dollar in terms of a “basket” comprising the currencies
of most of America’s leading trading partners. To make it eas-
ier to compare this series with others in the same figure, it is
rescaled, so that the index equals 1 in the first quarter of 1995.
It fell in the third quarter after a three-quarter rally. The rally
has been attributed mostly to the rush into relatively safe dol-
lar-denominated assets. Now that most financial markets and
major banks appear to be stronger, many investors have con-
verted safe-haven investments such as U.S. Treasury securities
into foreign securities and deposits, a fact that partly explains
the downturn in the value of the dollar. If policymakers can
stave off further serious financial turmoil, the dollar may
decline further, permitting some improvement in the current

















































































































Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; 
IMF; BEA; authors’ calculations 
Note: German data for years prior to 1990 are the current account balances of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Amounts shown for “OPEC Countries and 
Russia” do not include balances for Iraq prior to 2005 or for Russia before 
1992. 
Figure 11 Key Global Current Account Balances
Figure 12 Terms of Trade and the U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate
Terms of Trade (left scale)
Terms of Trade, Excluding Oil Imports (left scale)
Broad U.S. Dollar Exchange-rate Index (right scale)

















































































3.1account balance as it becomes cheaper for foreigners to buy
foreign currency to be used for purchases of U.S. exports.
But there are reasons to doubt that a devaluation of the
dollar is the only key to restoring balance in the current
accounts of the major economic powers, especially the grow-
ing surplus for oil-exporting nations shown in Figure 11. In
particular, a weakening of the dollar leads to a deterioration of
the terms of trade between the United States and its trading
partners (Figure 12). The terms of trade are defined as the
price of U.S. exports to foreign countries divided by the price
paid by U.S. buyers for the imports they purchase (with both
prices expressed in the same currency). When the terms of
trade go up, the prices of U.S. exports are rising more quickly
than the prices of U.S. imports. If the prices of traded goods
reflect the dynamics of domestic prices—or if exports and
imports comprise similar combinations of goods and serv-
ices—a rise in the terms of trade implies that the United States
is losing competitiveness vis-à-vis its trading partners. When
the composition of exports is different from that of imports,
high terms of trade usually reflect a national specialization in
exported goods or services that are relatively more expensive
than imported goods. 
When the price of oil is omitted from this index, as
shown in the figure by the blue line, there seems to be little
correlation with the U.S. dollar exchange rate, and the terms
of trade follow an upward trend. When we include oil imports,
the devaluation of the dollar in recent years has been associ-
ated with an upward movement in the price of oil and a dete-
rioration in the terms of trade, while a revaluation of the
dollar brings a movement in the opposite direction. It is inter-
esting to note that this correlation between the price of oil and
the dollar was not so marked in the 1990s.
In other words, before this decade, oil exporters usually
kept the price of oil stable in dollars, keeping the cost to
Americans of imported petroleum products stable even when
the value of their currency changed. Conversely, in recent
years, oil exporters (with the cooperation of other partici-
pants in world markets) have more often chosen to reprice
their exports with each change in the value of the dollar, forc-
ing Americans to pay a higher price for oil imports as the
exchange rate fell during most of 2007 and 2008. This negative
correlation between the nominal exchange rate and import
prices—in this case, the price of oil—is known as “exchange
rate pass-through” and has continued this year. It is reflected
in the overall terms of trade. However, exporters of services
and goods other than oil are less likely to reprice their exports
to the United States in this way, leading to the weaker correla-
tion between the exchange rate and the nonoil terms of trade
(Figure 12).
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Figure 13 U.S. Current Account and Trade Balances
Trade Balance, Net of Oil Imports
Current Account Balance
Trade Balance










































































Figure 14 Real GDP of U.S. Trading Partners: Historical 
Data and Baseline Assumptions  
Pre-2008 Trend (Cubic Function Fitted to Data)
Real GDP of U.S. Trading Partners
Sources: IMF; World Bank; authors’ calculations. See also Shaikh, 


















1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015The observation of exchange rate pass-through has impli-
cations for our understanding of the effects of exchange-rate
changes on the current account deficit. Economists view a deval-
uation of the dollar as one of the main tools available to reduce
the trade deficit. However, the “terms-of-trade effect” limits the
effectiveness of this policy instrument, since Americans spend
more money on imported goods and services as their prices
rise—unless they buy less of these foreign commodities.
This perverse relationship between the terms of trade,
exports, and imports was exemplified by the case of oil
imports during most of the current decade, as shown in
Figure 13. The exchange rate and the terms of trade began
steady declines in about 2002, which soon led to a long rise in
the dollar amount of oil imports, seen in the figure as a
widening gap between the total trade balance and same bal-
ance minus oil imports. (All balances have been divided by
GDP.) If similar links between the exchange rate, the terms of
trade, and oil imports hold in the near future, it may not be
best to rely entirely upon exchange-rate devaluations to lower
the current account deficit. 
For this and other reasons, large international imbalances
call for policy responses that extend beyond exchange-rate
adjustments, including measures to reduce demand for some
imported goods. These policies could, for example, respond to
the urgent need to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, which is
resistant to exchange-rate adjustment. We would support a
massive investment in clean energy and energy conservation
that would create “green jobs” and help forestall global climate
change. We discuss policy options further in the concluding
section of this strategic analysis. 
Baseline Scenario
The economy’s state in 2009, as described above, has evolved
along the lines we outlined in our previous strategic analysis
(Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza 2008). Unemployment
was projected to reach above 10 percent, and the October fig-
ure of 10.2 percent—and trending upward—is close to our
projected path. One of the major drivers of our scenarios was
the expected fall in household borrowing, which we assumed
would fall into negative territory and, in our baseline projec-
tion, remain below zero through the end of 2012. The latest
figures from the Federal Reserve Flow-of-Funds dataset reaf-
firm our assumptions up to the second quarter of 2009, and
recent figures on consumer credit in August show that nega-
tive borrowing (i.e., debt repayments in excess of new loans)
may very well follow our projections in the coming months.
For our new baseline projection, we adopt the April 2009
International Monetary Fund (IMF) projection for the real
and nominal GDPs of U.S. trading partners.2 Our index for
real GDP3 is reported in Figure 14, which shows that world
output growth will get back to trend in 2011, but that the net
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
Figure 15 Private Sector Borrowing: Historical Data and 
Baseline Assumptions  
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015loss in output generated by the current recession will not be
made up through faster growth. 
We assume that the price of oil and prices in U.S. trading
partners will both grow at around 2 percent, and that the U.S.
dollar exchange rate will stabilize at the current (third quarter,
2009) level. We next assume that confidence will gradually
return to financial markets, so that borrowing by both house-
holds and businesses starts to revert, very gradually, toward its
long-term average (Figure 15). We posit that net household
borrowing will stay negative, but fall as a percentage of GDP,
until 2013; our new assumptions on borrowing are therefore
more optimistic than those we adopted in our last strategic
analysis.
Finally, in our baseline scenario we verify the conse-
quences of the end of the fiscal stimulus, using projections
from the latest Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report
(2009). The CBO projects that the government deficit will
drop considerably in the next two years, reaching 11.2 percent
of GDP for fiscal year 2009, 9.6 percent in 2010, 6.1 percent in
2011, and around 3 percent from 2012 onward (Figure 16).
This reduction in the deficit is assumed to derive partly from
an increase in revenues due to a rise in individual income tax
revenues from 6.5 percent of GDP in 2009 to 10 percent in
2014. Overall, outlays will fall, especially those classified as
“mandatory spending,” but outlays related to servicing the
debt will increase steadily. 



















































Scenario 1 (Postponed Deficit Reduction)
Scenario 2  (U.S. Dollar Devaluation and Some Deficit Reduction)
Sources: BLS 2009b; authors’ calculations
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We emphasize that our scenarios are conditional projec-
tions, not forecasts: they are meant to show what is likely to
happen over a horizon of about six years if certain assump-
tions turn out to be true. Our medium-term approach means
that we do not focus on making precise statements about the
outlook for the next six months.
All of our assumptions, taken together, imply that real
GDP growth will resume but remain sluggish throughout our
simulation period, staying well below the rate required to
reduce unemployment, which will hover around 10 percent
through the end of the simulation period in 2015 (Figure 17).
Under this scenario, all financial imbalances will converge
toward zero (Figure 18). The general government deficit will
peak at nearly 11.3 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of
this year (somewhat above our assumption of an 11.2 percent
deficit for the entire fiscal year that ended in September) and
then drop below 4 percent at the end of the simulation period,
which is in the first quarter of fiscal year 2016. Our assumed
gradual increase in private sector borrowing, along with
income growth, will lower the private sector surplus toward
its prebubble historical norm. Finally, slow growth will help
shrink the current account deficit to less than 1 percent of
GDP by the end of the simulation period. 
Household debt outstanding will drop considerably, from
the current 97 percent of GDP to 78 percent by the end of the
simulation period, while debt of the nonfinancial businessThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
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sector will stabilize at around 73 percent of GDP. However,
sustained government deficits will increase the stock of gov-
ernment debt4 from the current 61 percent of GDP to 91 per-
cent of GDP by the end of the simulation period. These
projections of debt outstanding may appear to be quite high,
but they will be sustainable provided that interest rates are kept
at their current historically low level, as we assume in our base-
line scenario.
It is clear from our analysis that the fiscal stimulus has
provided strong support to aggregate demand, preventing
further damage, but it has not been sufficient to lower unem-
ployment. With private sector demand slowly coming back—
owing to improvements in the stock market and the
stabilization of the housing market and credit conditions—
the end of the fiscal stimulus will nevertheless leave the econ-
omy in a “growth recession.”
The results from our baseline simulation may seem pes-
simistic, given that growth could resume at a faster pace in the
economies of U.S. trading partners. In particular, some ana-
lysts claim that emerging economies, notably India and
China, are “decoupling” from the world recession by applying
fiscal stimuli aimed at strengthening domestic demand. If sus-
tained, such policies will have a positive effect on U.S. exports,
but it may be smaller than one would hope. Figure 19 shows a
breakdown of U.S. exports by destination country. Only 3.6
percent of U.S. exports in 2008 went to China (or 0.6 percent
of GDP). The bulk of U.S. exports go to Europe (35.3 percent,
or 6.3 percent of GDP), and Canada and Mexico (21.1 per-
cent, or 3.8 percent of GDP, combined), so even a major
increase in domestic demand in developing economies other
than Mexico will have only a minor impact on U.S. exports,
and hence on U.S. aggregate demand and employment.
Scenario 1: Postponing the Fiscal Adjustment
In our next scenario, we assume that the government main-
tains its current fiscal policies, postponing measures to
address the deficit.  More specifically, government expendi-
tures on goods and services, as well as net government trans-
fers, are kept at their historical prerecession trend in nominal
terms, and the Bush tax cuts are extended. In all other
respects, scenario 1 retains the assumptions used in the base-
line scenario.
In this scenario, unemployment falls below 7 percent by
the end of the simulation period (Figure 17). We project U.S.
GDP growth rates to be above 3 percent on average, yet not
high enough to close the output gap that opened in the reces-
sion. Figure 20 depicts the projected paths of the three sectoral
balances. The government deficit declines very slowly with the
rise in GDP, and government debt reaches 100 percent of GDP
by the end of the simulation period (9 points above its base-
line level). As domestic demand grows, however, the current
account deficit worsens, increasing from its current value of2.6 percent of GDP to 4.1 percent of GDP by the end of the
simulation period. At the current juncture, therefore, any pol-
icy that sustains growth in order to generate a drop in unem-
ployment is likely to bring back the problem of current
account imbalances.
Scenario 2: A Further U.S. Dollar Depreciation
Like Martin Feldstein (2009) and some other well-known 
neoclassical economists, we have argued many times for a
devaluation of the dollar (Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza
2008). In our last exercise, we verify the consequences of a fur-
ther moderate decline in the U.S. dollar, so that its value, as
measured by the broad nominal index published by the Fed,
would be 11.9 percent lower than its current (2009q3) value,
and only 2 percent below what it was in the second quarter of
2008. A dollar devaluation will raise the cost of oil imports,
but it will be effective in increasing net exports, with an
impact on aggregate demand that would permit a tighter fis-
cal policy than in our previous scenario. Therefore, we also
assume that the government deficit is slowly reduced relative
to its level in our previous scenario (but not as much as in the
baseline scenario).
Under these hypotheses, unemployment falls in line with
our previous fiscal policy experiment, dropping below 7.5
percent at the end of the simulation period (Figure 17). As
Figure 21 shows, the government deficit falls faster than in the
previous scenario, reaching 5.6 percent of GDP by the end of
the simulation period, while the adverse effects of faster
domestic growth on the U.S. current account balance are now
countered by growth in net exports. The nonoil balance of
trade moves into surplus, while the overall current account
deficit stabilizes at a sustainable 1.3 percent of GDP. A modest
dollar devaluation could prove to be a very effective pro-
employment policy, while at the same time directly addressing
the medium-term threat posed by large imbalances.
Conclusion 
We are aware that a further, orderly devaluation of the U.S.
dollar may not be achieved by market forces, and that—on the
contrary—the United States should expect strong resistance
from the European Central Bank to further appreciation of
the euro. The devaluation should be brought about by a mul-
tilateral agreement with the central banks of major surplus
countries, particularly in East Asia.
Failure to deal with the overvaluation of the dollar could
lead to adverse consequences beyond those mentioned in the
discussion and scenarios above. In one plausible scenario that
we have not formally modeled, investors might sell U.S.
Treasury securities en masse, leading to a sudden collapse of
the dollar. In turn, a flight from the dollar might bring a large
increase in U.S. interest rates, reverse the economy’s path
toward sustainable sectoral balances, and bring back financial
fragility. 
Many economists are of the opinion that a sharp fiscal
retrenchment could be used to head off such a catastrophe,
but with the economy still so weak, we believe that it is unre-
alistic to expect a tighter fiscal policy anytime soon. In fact, of
the three simulations reported in this strategic analysis, only the
two involving some loosening of fiscal policy (scenarios 1 and
2) resulted in any progress toward full employment. 
Since debates about stimulus packages began last year,
there has been a flurry of discussion on the effects of fiscal
policy in blogs and newspapers (for an example, see Barro
2009). Some economists argue that when the government
increases deficits or hires new workers, businesses cut produc-
tion. Often, their arguments depend on the idea of Ricardian
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Figure 21 Main Sector and Trade Balances in Scenario 2,
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equivalence—that taxpayers put aside substantially more
money for future tax payments when the government deficit-
spends. To show that this effect completely offsets the effects
of higher government deficits requires assumptions that seem
unrealistic. Also, some analyses implicitly assume that there
are no unemployed resources in the economy, so that govern-
ment cannot hire workers or borrow money without reducing
the amount of these “inputs” available to private industry. It is
no surprise that we find different results than the antistimu-
lus economists, as the Levy Institute macro model (like any
Keynesian model) avoids such premises.
With a significant reduction in fiscal deficits out of the
question for now, a gradual devaluation may be the only alter-
native to high current account deficits and—conceivably—a
sudden currency crash. This medicine would probably be
potent: the successful devaluation modeled in scenario 2
would reduce the exchange rate by less than 12 percent, to val-
ues seen as recently as a decade and a half ago.
However, a significant devaluation alone would not sig-
nificantly and quickly reduce oil imports. In scenario 2, oil
imports are about one third greater than the entire U.S. cur-
rent account deficit by the end of the simulation period. Oil
imports do not change much in this scenario because of the
weakness we have described in the response of this variable to
changes in the nominal exchange rate. 
An international pact could help reduce fossil-fuel con-
sumption in the United States and abroad, but it now appears
that the global climate summit in Copenhagen (December
6–18) is unlikely to produce a strong agreement on carbon
emissions. Global imbalances give us another important rea-
son to support current national efforts to develop alternative
energy sources such as solar power, and to urge the expansion
of these initiatives. 
Our policy conclusions can then be summarized in five points:
1)  If stimulative policies are adopted, the current account
deficit will likely begin growing again over the medium
term, as the economy strengthens, unless countervailing
measures are adopted. This threat calls for stronger
efforts to devalue the U.S. dollar, especially against under-
valued Asian currencies. 
2)  Scenario 2 demonstrates that high levels of government
borrowing (above 5 percent of GDP through 2015) will
be sustainable, and need not jeopardize current account
rebalancing over the medium term, provided that the
dollar depreciates and interest rates remain low. 
3)  Unemployment will be the key economic problem for at
least several years, as it is the most important social cost
of recessions and will remain very high without strongly
stimulative fiscal policy. 
4)  The government should devote more effort and money to
developing alternative energy sources and encouraging
energy conservation, as a devaluation alone would not
have a large impact on oil imports. Such initiatives dove-
tail with other efforts to improve air quality and slow
global climate change.
5) President Obama’s recent public disagreement with
President Hu Jintao of China over a possible revaluation
of the renminbi underscores the challenge of a multilat-
eral approach to currency adjustments and shows that
much work remains to be done at an international level
to achieve sustainable growth. 
Notes
1.  The liabilities data are part of the Federal Reserve Board’s
flow-of-funds dataset and are not seasonally adjusted;
quarterly GDP figures are seasonally adjusted by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, the agency that collects the
data. Throughout this strategic analysis, we make use of
official seasonally adjusted data when they are publicly
available.
2.  IMF (2009c), as updated in IMF (2009b). 
3.  The methodology behind our index is described in
Shaikh, Zezza, and Dos Santos (2003a, 2003b).
4.  We model government debt as the cumulated sum of
government deficits.Appendix
The national accounting identity is a relationship among the
three main sector balances:
Private Sector Deficit + Government Deficit + Current
Account Balance = 0   (1)
The derivation builds on two well-known key identities. One
identity shows the demand components of GDP:
GDP = Private expenditure (PE) + Government
Expenditure (GE) + Net exports (NE)   (2)
where private expenditure is the sum of consumption and
gross investment, including the change in inventories. From
the income side, we have 
GDP = National income (Y) - Net income from abroad
(NYFA)   (3)
Equating the right-hand side of equations (2) and (3), and
using symbols, we have
Y - NYFA = PE + GE + NE   (4)
Disposable income of the private sector is given by national
income, less any net payments from the private sector to the
government (TG), plus any net payments from the foreign
sector to the private sector (TW) that are not already meas-
ured in national income. Using YD for the disposable income
of the private sector, we have
YD = Y - TG + TW   (5)
using equation (5) in (4) we get 
YD + TG - TW - NYFA = PE + GE + NE   (6)
and rearranging 
(PE - YD) + (GE - TG) + (NE + TW + NYFA) = 0   (7)
Adding and subtracting net payments from the government
to the foreign sector, GW, we get 
(PE - YD) + (GE - TG + GW) + (NE + TW + NYFA -
GW) = 0   (8)
The first expression in brackets measures the difference
between total expenditure of the private sector and disposable
income, or “Private Sector Deficit.” The second bracket meas-
ures all government payments, less receipts, or “Government
Deficit,” while the last bracket measures all monetary net
inflows into the country, or the “Current Account Balance.”
Or, in other words
Private Sector Deficit + Government Deficit + Current 
Account Balance = 0 (1)
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